The name of the arithmetic hierarchy comes from logic: its sets are exactly the sets definable by a first-order formula in the language of arithmetic, with addition and multiplication, interpreted in the natural numbers. The number of quantifier alternations of the formula is the level in the hierarchy. The difficult direction is to express computations by formulas, which is done with Gödel’s β-function. Two classical results follow: truth in cannot be defined in arithmetic (Tarski), and no computably axiomatized theory proves all true sentences of arithmetic (Gödel).
4.1 The language of arithmetic
The language of arithmetic has a constant , a unary function symbol , binary function symbols and , and a binary relation symbol , together with equality. Terms are built from variables and with , and ; formulas from equations and inequalities between terms with , , , , and . Formulas are interpreted in the standard model , with the usual operations. For a formula and integers , we write if holds in when is interpreted as . The numeral of is the term with symbols .
A relation is definable (in arithmetic) if there is a formula with for every .
A formula is bounded if every quantifier in it has the form or , written and , where is a term not containing . A formula is a formula with bounded, and a relation is -definable if it is defined by a formula.
Every relation defined by a bounded formula is primitive recursive.
The value of a term is a primitive recursive function of its variables, by induction on the term, since successor, addition and multiplication are primitive recursive. The relations and are primitive recursive, and primitive recursive relations are closed under Boolean operations and bounded quantifiers whose bound is a primitive recursive function of the free variables (Corollary 5.10 of “Primitive recursive functions”). The result follows by induction on the formula.
The -definable relations are closed under conjunction, disjunction, existential quantification, bounded existential quantification, and bounded universal quantification .
For conjunction and disjunction, rename the bound variables apart and move the existential quantifiers to the front: is equivalent to . Existential quantification is immediate, and is equivalent to . For bounded universal quantification, the collection principle holds in :
where abbreviates . From left to right, choose witnesses for each of the finitely many values of and let exceed all of them. The right-hand side is a formula.
The equivalences are equivalences in : the formulas are not syntactically , but they define the same relations as formulas. This is all that matters for definability.
4.2 Computations are Σ₁-definable
For every primitive recursive function , the graph is -definable.
By induction on the definition of as a primitive recursive function. The basic functions have the bounded definitions , and .
Composition. If and the graphs of and of the are defined by formulas and , then
which is -definable by Lemma 4.4.
Primitive recursion. Let and . A computation of is the finite sequence of values , which by Gödel’s lemma (Gödel) is represented by two integers through the β-function (Definition 6.5 of “Coding finite sequences”). The graph of is defined by the bounded formula
Then if and only if there are and such that , such that for every , and such that . Indeed, if these conditions hold, the values are by induction on ; conversely, Gödel’s lemma provides and encoding the sequence . Written with the formulas for the graphs of , and , each condition is -definable, the second one by bounded universal quantification over a -definable relation. By Lemma 4.4, the graph of is -definable.
A relation is -definable if and only if it is c.e. Every computable relation is defined both by a formula and by the negation of a formula.
A -definable relation is the projection of a relation defined by a bounded formula, which is computable by Lemma 4.3; so it is c.e. Conversely, by Kleene's normal form, if and only if , with primitive recursive. If is the characteristic function of , then , and the graph of is -definable by Theorem 4.5; so is -definable. For a c.e. relation of arity , the same argument applies with , since a c.e. relation is the domain of a partial computable function of arguments. A computable relation and its complement are c.e., which gives the second statement.
4.3 Definable sets are arithmetic
A relation is definable in arithmetic if and only if it is arithmetic. More precisely, for , a relation is if and only if it is defined by a formula where is a formula or the negation of one, according to the parity of .
If is , then with computable, and is defined both by a formula and by the negation of one (Corollary 4.6); choosing the first when is ( odd) and the second when is ( even) gives a definition of the stated form. Conversely, in a formula of the stated form, defines a relation when is odd and a relation when is even (Corollary 4.6). Then defines a relation of the same class, by Proposition 1.4, and each of the remaining quantifiers, of the kind opposite to the one after it, raises the level by one: in front of a relation gives a relation, and in front of a relation a relation. The relation defined is therefore .
For the first statement, it remains to show that every definable relation is arithmetic, by induction on formulas. Atomic formulas define computable relations. The arithmetic relations are closed under complement, since and are complements of each other and ; under finite unions and intersections, since a and a relation are both ; and under quantification, since applied to a relation gives a relation, and applied to a relation gives a relation (Proposition 1.4).
4.4 Truth is not arithmetic
Formulas are finite strings over a finite alphabet, and we fix a computable coding of formulas by integers, under which the usual syntactic operations are computable. In particular, given and , the code of the sentence is computable.
The set is not arithmetic. In particular, it is not definable in arithmetic.
Every arithmetic set is many-one reducible to : by Theorem 4.7, some formula defines , and , and is computable. Suppose is . The set is arithmetic, so it reduces to , and it would be by Proposition 1.6. But , and is not (Corollary 2.3). The second statement follows by Theorem 4.7.
The set is in fact Turing equivalent to , the uniform join of all the finite jumps: the truth of a prenex sentence with blocks of quantifiers can be decided with the oracle , uniformly in , and conversely is reducible to , uniformly in . We admit this refinement (see Rogers’ book); it is the starting point of the hyperarithmetic hierarchy, which continues the jump along computable ordinals.
Let be a set of sentences true in whose set of theorems is c.e. Then some true sentence is not a theorem of .
The set of theorems of is c.e., hence , and it is contained in , since the theorems of a set of true sentences are true. If it were equal to , then would be , contradicting Theorem 4.8.
For a theory given by a computable set of axioms, the set of theorems is c.e., since proofs are finite objects whose correctness is decidable; we admit this, which belongs to a course on logic. Gödel’s original theorem is stronger in two respects: for theories that contain a weak fragment of arithmetic, it assumes only the -consistency of , not its truth (Rosser (1936) weakened this hypothesis to consistency), and it produces an explicit unprovable sentence.
4.5 Exercises
Show that the graph of exponentiation is -definable, by a direct use of the β-function.
Solution
if and only if there are with , for all , and . Each condition is -definable, using the bounded definition of the graph of ; the second one by Lemma 4.4. The same proof as in Theorem 4.5 shows that this defines the graph.
Show that a set is computable if and only if it is defined both by a formula and by the negation of a formula.
Solution
By Corollary 4.6, a set defined by a formula is c.e., and a set defined by the negation of a formula is co-c.e.; a set that is both is computable (Proposition 4.8 of “Computably enumerable sets”). The converse is the second statement of the corollary.
Show that the set of codes of true sentences is -complete.
Solution
The truth of a bounded sentence is decidable, uniformly in its code, by evaluating it: the quantifiers range over finite sets, whose bounds are values of closed terms. A sentence is true if and only if some tuple makes true, which is a c.e. condition on the code. For completeness, let be a formula defining the relation , by Corollary 4.6. Then is a true sentence, and is computable.
4.6 Notes and references
The β-function and the representation of recursive functions in arithmetic are due to Gödel (1931). The undefinability of truth is due to Tarski (1933, published in German in 1936). The equivalence between definability and the arithmetic hierarchy is due to Kleene (1943) and Mostowski (1947). Smoryński’s book and Kaye’s book on models of Peano arithmetic give detailed treatments.
- K. Gödel, Über formal unentscheidbare Sätze der Principia Mathematica und verwandter Systeme I, Monatshefte für Mathematik und Physik 38 (1931), 173–198.
- A. Tarski, Der Wahrheitsbegriff in den formalisierten Sprachen, Studia Philosophica 1 (1936), 261–405.
- R. Kaye, Models of Peano Arithmetic, Oxford University Press, 1991.
- C. Smoryński, Logical Number Theory I, Springer, 1991.
- J. B. Rosser, Extensions of some theorems of Gödel and Church, Journal of Symbolic Logic 1 (1936), 87–91.
- H. Rogers, Theory of Recursive Functions and Effective Computability, McGraw-Hill, 1967.